Surveillance
Surveillance in China can be broadly categorised into three main forms: monitoring and censorship of online activities, technological surveillance - through the use of cameras and phone data, and in-person monitoring. Authorities justify the continuing expansion of surveillance infrastructure as a way to improve public safety, crime-fighting, and "social stability".
While various types of surveillance are widespread in China, in Xinjiang this has taken on a unique dimension in recent years. Following the Urumqi riot in 2009 and further violent incidents in Xinjiang in the years after Xi Jinping became General Secretary, in 2014 Xi declared that Xinjiang was now the “frontline” of China’s battle against “terrorism”, and consequently a testing ground for new policing and surveillance methods.
One initiative, designed to “safeguard social stability”, saw CCP cadres from government agencies, state-owned enterprises, and public institutions regularly visit homes in Xinjiang to monitor residents; between 2014 and 2018 around 200,000 personnel took part. In October 2016, authorities initiated a related effort, called the “Becoming Family” campaign, in which about 110,000 officials visited the population in southern Xinjiang every two months with a view toward “fostering ethnic harmony.”
Within the same period, cultural repression intensified with the shutdown of Uyghur language schools and new rules curtailing the practice of Islam. Increasingly, online Uyghur cultural spaces - in the form of websites and discussion platforms - were blocked by Chinese censors and the mobile service shut off of those attempting to circumvent internet restrictions.
Freedom of movement was also further restricted. While previously Uyghurs were required to carry special ID cards if they travelled internally, in 2016 a new policy mandated a blanket recall of residents’ passports for annual review and “collective management”, following which police would retain them for “safekeeping”.
That same year, Chen Quanguo was elected as Xinjiang’s Party Secretary. Credited with “restoring stability” in his previous role in Tibet through the introduction of widespread surveillance and “zero-distance” policing, Chen’s election would see these measures expand across Xinjiang, beginning with a rapid intensification of security measures.
The year Chen came into power, Xinjiang received its largest boost in policing capabilities than ever before. Security-related job postings more than tripled in the space of a year. 2016 also saw the introduction in Xinjiang of the Integrated Joint Operation Platform (IJOP), a system which uses widespread surveillance data collection, facial recognition and artificial intelligence to identify people for questioning and potential detention. Increasing numbers of foot-soldiers, combined with the IJOP, rapidly expanded the Party’s surveillance capabilities, providing what local media described as “complete coverage without any chinks, blind spots, or blank spaces”.
In addition, while previous governments required passport applicants in Xinjiang to supply biometric data (including DNA samples, fingerprints, iris scans and blood types), in 2017 this was reported by Human Rights Watch to have expanded to include all residents in the region between the age of 12 and 65.
As the system of mass detention and re-education camp construction began to accelerate in early 2017, construction bids for new facilities - branded as “vocational” - called for extensive security installations, with some now including police stations on the same compound. For existing detention facilities, many bids also required the installation of comprehensive security features, including barbed wire, reinforced security doors and windows, surveillance systems, watchtowers, and guard rooms or facilities for armed police.
For those released from detention, regular police visits serve as a reminder that they can be detained again at any time. For those sent to work in factories across China as part of labour transfers, in addition to factory-organised “patriotic education” classes outside of work hours and constant surveillance by government minders within the factories, CCP cadres are sent to simultaneously surveil workers’ families back home in Xinjiang, a reminder to workers that any misbehaviour in the factory will have immediate consequences for their loved ones.
For Uyghurs who live overseas report receiving text messages from the police department of their locale in Xinjiang demanding passport and residency information, emphasising the threat their family may face for speaking out against the regime.